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1 Executive summary 
All recently published studies agree. Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) increasingly 
constitute a target for cyber-attacks aimed at disturbing Member States’ economies, at disabling our 
critical infrastructures or at taking advantage of our people. Such hostile acts take place in a context of 
geostrategic tensions, for the satisfaction of organised crime’s purposes, or else in support of possible 
activist causes. 
 
In this context, the ERNCIP Thematic Group (TG), Case studies for the Cyber-security of Industrial 
Automation & Control Systems was started in January 2014 to answer the question: ‘Do European 
critical infrastructure operators need to get IACS’ components or sub-systems tested and “certified” 
(T&C) with regard to their cyber-security?’ And if the answer was yes, it had to answer a corollary 
question: ‘What are (roughly) the conditions of feasibility for successfully implementing a European IACS 
T&C scheme (1)?’ 
 
This TG’s undertaking was a research project, not a task force seeking to deliver an immediately 
applicable standard. It mobilised representatives of IACS vendors, industrial operators, European 
Institutions and national cyber-security authorities. 
 
This report presents: 
• The results of 13 short case studies and TG experts’ discussions that helped in answering the 
first question: they concluded that industry operators had an appetite for cyber-security certified 
IACS products. In addition, they showed that provided a European certification scheme would be 
in line with the state of the art, supported by mutual recognition agreements (2) between 
Member States (and beyond Europe), and not mandatory, it would be viable for vendors. 
• A set of research directions in the form of a possible European IACS Cyber-security Compliance & 
Certification (C&C) scheme (3), as an answer to the corollary question: 2 levels of increasingly 
trustworthy compliance assessment and 2 levels of increasingly demanding certification were 
identified and broadly depicted. These four levels were intended to engage vendors progressively 
into certification and to provide clients and national cyber-security authorities with a flexible tool 
to specify the level of their requirements for compliance, procurement and other purposes. This 
C&C scheme relies on a few important assumptions: 
o All existing cyber-security certification standards applicable to IACS products of a 
designated level of criticality (4) verify that products comply with common cyber-security 
requirements: therefore, given the intense discussions about the choice of a standard 
finding their common denominator to create a European scheme could be an idea; 
o Product certification is easier to implement than system certification in the first place and, 
as IACS products are developed by many suppliers from all over the world and as, in 
comparison, certifying their development process is harder, limiting our ambition initially 
to product certification sounds like a good, realistic first step towards the benefit of the 
industrial community. 
• A research and action roadmap towards the possible implementation of the proposed European 
IACS components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification Scheme: it proposes a set of seven 
actions to be run over the 2015-20 period. This plan should start very soon with Action No 1 
aiming at prioritising work, at engaging a wider set of stakeholders and at creating the conditions 
for an effective implementation of a European IACS components Cyber-security Compliance & 
Certification Scheme within what appears to be a favourable window of opportunity. 
                                            
(1) The term scheme was used in this report by virtue of its original brief. See the proposed scheme in section 5.3. 
(2) This is an issue to be addressed in project #5 of the action plan (see Section 6). 
(3) The report shows that we moved from the concept of Testing & Certification to that of Compliance & Certification. 
(4) A risk analysis, or knowing that the target sector of use could help in determining the criticality of IACS components. 
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NB: Project No 1 will frame the work to be done in project Nos 2 to 7 and, as needed, its 
participants will then have an opportunity to refine the proposals and schedule proposed in 
this report as an input to DG JRC. 
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3 Introduction: background, goals, principles, limits 
and structure of the study 
3.1 The ERNCIP 
The European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP) forms part of the 
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), and aims at providing a framework 
within which experimental installations will share knowledge and expertise throughout Europe leading to 
improved protection of critical infrastructure against all hazards. ERNCIP objectives are to harmonise 
test protocols, and to improve the conditions for EU-wide certification and standardisation of security 
solutions. This will be a step change towards a more trusted, homogeneous and outreaching EU market 
for security-related equipment and systems, services and applications from which all CIP-related 
stakeholders will benefit. The mission of ERNCIP is, ‘to foster the emergence of innovative, qualified, 
efficient and competitive security solutions, through networking of European experimental capabilities’. 
3.2 Background 
Cyber-attacks targeting industrial automation and control systems (IACS) have been perpetrated for 
some years already. STUXNET, the piece of malware that affected Iranian nuclear installations, was 
probably climactic in raising the industrial community’s awareness of the risk plants, their neighbourhood 
and customers might suffer should a significant cyber-attack hit them. The (ENISA, 2013) threat 
landscape indicates that the various cyber-threats targeting critical infrastructures are increasing. And 
the question of the potential impacts of cyber-attacks on IACS had been raised even earlier, for instance 
in (Stamp, Laviolette, Phillips, & Richardson, 2009). 
 
Thus, the (ENISA, 2011) report’s recommendation No 5 reflected the industrial community’s need to test 
and certify IACS’ cyber-security in those terms: 
 
‘ICS manufacturers are starting to (or will have to) include security requirements in the 
design phase of ICS components and applications. However, operators indicate that 
independent evaluations and tests are missing to effectively guarantee that those devices 
are in fact secure and that interoperability has also been considered when the new security 
features/capabilities are included. Furthermore, penetration tests and white box audits in 
controlled laboratories have shown that there are basic security bugs in devices and 
applications that could be properly identified if security development good practices were 
included into the development cycle. In any case, manufacturers, ICS security tools and 
services providers, as well as operators cannot be completely aware of the implications a 
modification may have with respect to their own systems or third-party ones. Moreover, it is 
important to certify that ICS do comply with minimum quality requirements with respect to 
cyber-security programming bugs.’ (p. 45). 
3.3 Questions 
The Case studies for the Cyber-security of Industrial Automation & Control Systems thematic group (TG) 
sought to answer two connected questions: 
1. Can we confirm the need of European critical infrastructure (CI) operators to have the cyber-
security of IACS components or sub-systems that they buy from vendors tested and ‘certified’ 
(T&C) through at least three case studies? 
2. If yes, what would be the principal conditions of feasibility to make such a scheme happen? 
o How should it be done? 
o Based on which standard(s)? 
o Who should do it? 
o Where should it be done? 
o Who should bear the costs for its development? 
Case studies for the cyber-security of IACS 
 
 
 ERNCIP Project 10 
o What is the benefit? 
3.4 Goals 
Started with a kick-off meeting in March 2014 after a pre-meeting held in Paris in January 2014, and to 
be ended in November 2014, it was to deliver: 
• The results of at least three case studies showing how industrial operators’ need for cyber-
security testing and certification would be expressed: 
o The idea of performing case studies stemmed from (Mahan, et al., 2011) who, based on 
an IEC 62443 generic IACS architecture, identified data transfers as points of vulnerability 
in IACS. In the present report, we considered data links as one of the potential points of 
vulnerability of IACS and extended the principle. 
• A research and action roadmap towards a future EU IACS cyber-security certification scheme: 
o The ERNCIP Case studies for the cyber-security of Industrial Automation & Control 
Systems Thematic Group was conceived as a research project aiming at defining 
directions about how to tackle the TG’s research questions, not as an initiative aimed at 
delivering a proposal or standard to be immediately applicable. 
3.5 Methodology 
The TG’s work was organised in three successive phases: 
• Phase 1: Needs identification — 19 March 2014 (Kick-off) to June meeting, seeking to: 
o Set our common work plan for phase 1; 
o Identify case studies understood as points of potential cyber vulnerability within IACS; 
five case studies were identified; they refer to IACS components that can embed security 
functions and solutions but are not security products themselves: 
! SCADA (5) systems that supervise entire industrial systems; 
! PLCs/IEDs (6), i.e. field process automation and control equipment; 
! Engineering/Programming workstations that staff connect to in order to program 
the field components of an IACS; 
! Databases used for process control (if corrupted may create safety issues, e.g. in 
luggage handling); 
! Telecommunication links (for instance for remote equipment maintenance). 
o Each case study was to be situated in a sector of activity: 
! Hospital, airport, electricity distribution, car manufacturing, chemicals… 
o Phase 1’s method consisted of the following arrangements: 
! A questionnaire was elaborated in order to understand stakeholders’ views of the 
cyber threat and to analyse their background concerns behind the question of 
IACS cyber-security certification. This questionnaire was dispatched to TG 
members and other industrial operators. On reception of answers (13 in total) 
only basic statistics were performed in order to ‘profile’ the positions expressed by 
the respondents; 
! Literature review, including: (ENISA, 2011), (ENISA, 2013a), reports from the 
SCADA LAB project (7), (MITRE, 2011), cyber-security certification standards 
(Common Criteria — ISO 15408, ISA Secure (8) and its derived Wurldtech CRT 
scheme (9); 
                                            
(5) Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition; See (ENISA, 2011a) for detailed definitions of IACS components. 
(6) PLC: Programmable Logic Controller; IED: Intelligent Electronic Device. 
(7) at https://www.scadalab.eu/index.php/mod.documentos/mem.listado/relmenu.3 
(8) Managed by ISCI; see at www.isasecure.org  
(9) See at www.wurldtech.com  
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! A Project’s core team meeting to analyse and synthesise results and to elaborate 
findings before the June meeting; 
! A TG expert group meeting in June (Ispra) to discuss phase 1’s findings and to 
conclude on the need for IACS testing and certification in Europe. This meeting 
also discussed existing cyber-security schemes (CC, ISA Secure, Wurldtech) and 
confirmed the need for a European IACS certification scheme. It concluded that 
the focus of the scheme had to be on IACS components, i.e. individual products 
rather than sub-systems or systems. 
• Phase 2: Conditions of feasibility — 18 June 2014 to September meeting, seeking to: 
o Define the concept of IACS testing & certification if phase 1 answered yes to the question 
about the need for such a scheme in Europe; 
o Perform the corresponding feasibility study; 
o Define a plan of action towards the possible implementation of the scheme over the next 
five years. 
o Phase 2’s method consisted of the following arrangements: 
! The project’s core team first worked to elaborate a basic scheme proposal; 
! Face-to-face meetings with TG members (national cyber-security authority, 
industrial operators, vendor) were then organised to react to and to amend the 
proposed scheme; significant modifications were then brought to the original 
proposal and made it more realistic, helping to finesse the goals and broad 
characteristics of the scheme; 
! The project’s core team then finalised phase 2’s findings and elaborated a plan of 
action for the next five years (2015-20), and prepared the September meeting of 
the TG experts; 
! The TG expert group met in September (Ispra) to discuss and finalise the 
proposed European IACS components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification 
Scheme; 
! The proposed scheme was discussed with ENISA at the September meeting (video 
conference) and later presented at the ESSENCE Project’s meeting of 14 October. 
This latter presentation did not generate any revision of the scheme. 
• Phase 3: Report — 24 September 2014 to 1 November 2014, seeking to: 
o Deliver DG JRC the report of the thematic group’s work; 
o Phase 2’s method consisted of the following arrangements: 
! TG coordinators worked to write the final report of the study; 
! This report was reviewed by TG members and by DG JRC. 
The following diagram summarises the methodological process of the study: 
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Figure 1 The TG process 
In addition, three general principles were adopted from the start for the conduct of the study: 
• Pragmatism: 
o This TG has gathered a limited number of experts representing industry users/operators, 
vendors of IACS solutions and national cyber-security authorities; 
o Case studies were used to study essentially industry users’ background concerns that 
would lead to express a need for cyber-security testing and certification; 
o A focus on product certification from the very start, rather than on systems certification, a 
topic immediately considered as too wide and complicated to address. This view was of 
particular importance especially if considering that vendors should undergo such 
certification when they are not always, if not rarely, the integrators and installers of their 
industrial automation and control products. 
• Rapidity 
o Started in January 2014, the TG was to end its work in November 2014. Its work was 
organised with DG JRC only around the contribution of its limited set of experts and did 
not include larger meetings, nor dissemination activities. 
• Confidentiality 
o Traffic Light Protocol (10): all contributions, in phase 1, were made under this protocol and 
as a result this report only presents the synthesis and conclusions of the TG’s work. 
3.6 Limits of the study 
This work had a limited ambition, to propose research directions about IACS cyber-security testing and 
certification. The present report shows how this research into the two fundamental questions at hand 
was performed within the short time frame allocated to the TG by a limited set of people selected for 
their expertise, field practice and representativeness of the different parties in presence. However, it 
                                            
(10) See the explanation provided in the ERNCIP Membership Agreement on the website at https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/download-
area/finish/24-erncip-office-reports/46-erncip-tgs-membership-agreement  
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does not pretend to express all views possibly held by the immense number of industries, integrators 
and vendors who populate the industrial automation and control domain. 
3.7 Validation 
The directions that this report presents have been validated and are endorsed by the members of the 
TG. The validation process is described along this report as opportunity arises. This report outlines the 
precautions taken in the conduct of the study and in order to gain feedback from TG members, ENISA 
and outside audiences. In particular, this report draws the JRC’s attention to the rationale behind the 
collective progressive elaboration of the European IACS components Cyber-security Compliance & 
Certification Scheme. 
3.8 Structure of the report 
The report is presented as follows: 
• Chapter 4 presents the method, findings and conclusions of the case studies (phase 1); 
• Chapter 5 presents the European IACS components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification 
Scheme proposed as a result of phase 2; 
• Chapter 6 presents a proposition for a research and action plan for 2015-20; 
• Chapter 7 delivers the conclusions of our work; 
• Chapter 8 — Annexes — presents complementary elements in support of previous chapters; 
• Chapter 9 — Table of illustrations; 
• A bibliography is supplied at the end of the document. 
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4 Results and validation of the case studies 
Because of the small number of cases studied, the following results do not constitute a statistical 
analysis. Questionnaires were sent to industrial operators to collect their background perception of the 
cyber threat against IACS. Other stakeholders’ opinions were duly considered in the TG’s discussions, 
and all stakeholders should be involved in the action plan presented in Section 6. 
4.1 Results from the case studies 
This section shows how industrial operators present in the TG see the cyber-threat against IACS. 
4.1.1 Questionnaires: the background perception of the cyber-threat 
13 questionnaires were returned, all but one filled-in by industrial operators, the other being answered 
by a national cyber-security authority who presented the case of an industrial system: 
• 4 SCADA cases; 
• 1 process database case; 
• 3 engineering workstation cases; 
• 4 PLC cases; 
• 1 telecom link case. 
 
Respondents belong mainly to the energy sector: 
 
 
Figure 2 Respondents to the phase 1 questionnaire 
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They belong to the following Member States: 
 
 
Figure 3 Member States of origin of the phase 1 questionnaire 
 
Respondents consider that IACS cyber attackers belong almost equally to four categories: 
 
 
Figure 4 Sources of attacks (phase 1 questionnaire)  
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TG members believe that attackers have motivations that hard to hierarchise: 
 
 
Figure 5 Purpose of attacks (phase 1 questionnaire) 
 
They may use a panoply of attack vectors: 
 
 
Figure 6 Attack vectors (phase 1 questionnaire) 
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IACS’ vulnerabilities can be identified mainly internally, or by suppliers, TG members say: 
 
 
Figure 7 Who could reduce vulnerabilities (phase 1 questionnaire) 
 
These vulnerabilities can be identified through specific tests and ‘in production’ (i.e. during the operation 
of IACS): 
 
 
Figure 8 How vulnerabilities could be identified (phase 1 questionnaire) 
 
A number of means are suggested to identify cyber vulnerabilities in both contexts. However a voice was 
raised to say that identifying vulnerabilities in operation should be forbidden for this may create 
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operational risks. It also has to be noted that the techniques mentioned in this latter context belong in 
incident detection rather than vulnerability identification in the proper sense. 
4.1.2 Interpretation of the questionnaires 
In conclusion, the questionnaire suggests that: 
• TG members are well aware of the cyber threat; 
• TG members see the full picture of it but could not prioritise threats, motivations, vectors, etc; 
• TG members might currently resort to internal scanning techniques to detect attacks; 
• TG members might also wish for suppliers to take their share of the effort to identify 
vulnerabilities and to reduce them before IACS components are put into operation. 
This last point is interesting in the context of this study in the sense that it signifies that should vendors 
certify their IACS products, clients would welcome the initiative. 
4.1.3 Discussion of these results: the need for IACS certification 
The June meeting of our TG allowed discussion of these results. The main outcome of the debate was 
that: 
• TG experts unanimously agreed on the outcome of phase 1; 
• There is currently no European obligation for IACS cyber-security certification; 
• Previous ENISA studies have long affirmed the need for IACS cyber-security certification; 
• Additionally, in the USA, France, etc., some form of IACS cyber-security certification may have 
already started; 
• Users (11) basically want a reassurance that industrial products they buy are cyber secure; 
• Users would buy cyber-security certified IACS products rather than non-cyber-security certified 
ones, provided that this would come at an acceptable cost; 
• Compared with plants’ set-up and running costs, paying extra to get cyber-secured IACS 
products was said by participants to be inexpensive, though no clear consensus was reached; 
• Vendors added that selling cyber-security certified products would not entail unbearable extra 
costs for them and was feasible; 
• However if IEC 62443 is still a work in progress for some and a good reference for others, 
Common Criteria appear also as a possible candidate standard for T&C but were deemed too 
heavy and costly by other TG members who called for a lighter version of Common Criteria. 
In conclusion: 
• TG experts asserted the need for an IACS cyber-security T&C (12) scheme; 
• However T&C has limits: 
o It is valid for a given component, in a given version, for specified operating conditions; 
o Cyber-security testing and certification must focus on IACS products/components only 
(note that even PLCs may be already fairly complicated systems), not on entire systems 
or sub-systems. Beyond products’ T&C, integrators and users will need further efforts to 
cyber-secure systems and plants (engineering, HR qualification, etc.); 
o A well-shared scheme or standard is required in order to facilitate mutual recognition (13) 
of certificates across Europe (and beyond) and to keep certification costs and complexity 
down for vendors. 
                                            
(11) Process control engineering and procurement services. 
(12) T&C: abbreviation for Testing & Certification. 
(13) For more details on mutual recognition of certificates, refer to the IECEE/CB scheme at http://www.iecee.org/cbscheme/cbfunct.pdf  
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4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 ENISA’s 2011 report: Protecting Industrial Control Systems 
The (ENISA, 2011) report lists 10 recommendations. Among them, recommendation 5, Creation of a 
common test bed, or alternatively, an ICS security certification framework, states: 
 
‘The Common ICS security strategy should lead to the creation of a common test bed(s) at 
European level, as a Public-Private Partnership that leverages existing initiatives (e.g. 
EuroSCSiE). This test bed would make use of realistic environments with the appropriate 
resources for conducting independent verification and validation tests. These tests should 
include, at least: 
• Check the compliance of applications and systems with specific security profiles; 
• Verify and validate that programming good practices and methodologies are being 
applied; 
• Certify that ICT security tools and services are compatible with specific ICS systems, 
applications and specific set-ups. 
Product/services certification would not be mandatory but should also be considered as an 
option.’ 
4.2.2 ENISA’s 2013 report: Good Practices for an EU ICS Testing 
Coordination Capability 
Many experts consider necessary the creation or adaptation of existing certification frameworks to IACS 
environments as a way to ensure a minimum level of cyber-security of IACS infrastructures across the 
European Union. Some countries like Germany and England are currently working on adaptations of 
Common Criteria (ISO 15408) to IACS environments (14). 
 
Experts also indicated that testing without delivering a certification would convey less attractiveness and 
market value. Besides, a certification not based on tests would be insufficient. 
 
Several options have been expressed by experts about ‘what should be certified’: 
• Devices: Interesting for stakeholders, but already being done in several test beds and can be too 
costly for companies with many different products; 
• Development process: This could provide more reassurance than device-only certification; 
• Security postures: This is a direction some Member States are already working on; 
• Whole architecture of the systems; 
• Test beds: Many experts consider that in addition to any certification, a European body should 
accredit those centres that are mature enough to perform appropriate testing. 
The diversity of technologies and points of view is expected to be very challenging, especially when 
taking into account that many legacy components are still in production while others are much more up-
to-date. Also, the most current reference standards (15) in this field have been fairly well agreed upon 
though opinions vary about their maturity, but they can be used as a starting point. 
4.2.3 MITRE 2011 cyber resilience engineering framework 
Cyber-attacks come as a surprise, though to a fair extent much can be done to prevent their occurrence. 
Cyber resilience is an answer to this fact. As illustrated by three examples presented below, cyber 
resilience engineering frameworks are applied at the ‘system’ level rather than at the component/device 
level of testing and certification targets. However, such frameworks suggest that IACS component 
testing should assess not only their protective capabilities but also their reactive capabilities. 
                                            
(14) These projects are performed independently and, according to some experts, the compatibility of their approaches would have to be 
examined. 
(15) Like ISA-99. 
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The (MITRE, 2011) cyber resilience engineering framework defines cyber resilience as ‘The ability of a 
nation, organisation, or mission or business process to anticipate, withstand, recover from and evolve to 
improve capabilities in the face of, adverse conditions, stresses or attacks on the supporting cyber 
resources it needs to function.’ (p. 8). 
 
This definition accommodates two different views over cyber resilience: the technical perspective of 
systems able to withstand hazards and malicious acts, and the management perspective of organisations 
withstanding attacks over the systems on which they depend. 
 
It takes into account the following objectives: 
• to understand the threat; 
• to prepare for it; 
• to prevent it; 
• to continue activities despite it; 
• to constrain (limit) damages resulting from an attack; 
• to reconstitute a functioning system after an attack; 
• to transform the way activities are performed to lessen attack possibilities; 
• to re-architect systems in order to enhance their cyber-security capabilities. 
 
In order to fully address the cyber-risk, (MITRE, 2013) suggests that cyber resilience should be 
engineered according to the following logic: 
 
 
Figure 9 MITRE’s model of cyber-resilience engineering 
 
The ‘resilience umbrella’ model presented in (EUROCONTROL, 2012) Manual for National ATM Security 
Oversight includes pre-incident activities (prevention, preparation) and post-incident activities 
(emergency response, operational continuity, recovery). The feedback loop of systems and 
organisations’ improvement (transform, re-architect) seen in the MITRE model is not explicitly present. 
 
Another model of resilience engineering can be found in (ENISA, 2011a) and (THERON, 2013). 
Somehow consistent with (MITRE, 2011), first it is based on the idea that socio-technical systems may 
collapse under adverse circumstances. It defines target levels of resilience (from 1 — minor incidents — 
to 6 — extreme shocks) according to the severity of potential cyber-attacks. 
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Secondly, it articulates the engineering disciplines required to provide each target level of resilience: 
performance engineering, safety and security engineering, survivability engineering. 
 
Thirdly, these disciplines bring engineers to design and implement proactive pre-incident cyber-security 
mechanisms: prevision of potential threats (anticipation), prevention (elimination at source) of cyber 
threats, protection against threats that cannot be prevented, as well as reactive post-incident cyber-
security mechanisms: recognition (detection and analysis) of cyber-attacks, response to cyber-attacks 
(restoration of systems) and recovery (of full business performance and of enhanced daily capacities to 
thrive). 
4.2.4 Conclusion of the literature review 
Literature has already fairly much advocated cyber-security testing and certification (T&C) for IACS as 
seen in ENISA reports. Besides, they tend to put some emphasis on the device/component level as one 
that can be mastered more easily than systems as a whole. And they highlight stakeholders’ opposition 
to mandatory certification schemes (maybe for the time being…). Finally literature recognises that cyber-
attacks are unavoidable despite efforts placed on protective measures, and it calls for cyber-resilience. 
 
This suggests the following conclusions: 
1. The meaning of IACS components’ cyber-security certification is limited to the security objectives 
(security profile) of a given device in a given context. Beyond those limits, attackers may find 
ways to cyber-attack a device and certificates constitute no guarantee of results. 
2. To go beyond the certification of a device’s cyber-protective features, assessments could also 
address the process by which components are developed and the extent to which cyber-security 
is taken into account in this context. 
3. Cyber-security certification is currently envisaged as being limited to IACS components’ proactive 
pre-incident protection capabilities. But due to the rising need for cyber-resilience the question 
has to be asked (in a project of the action plan presented in Section 6) if certification should also 
cover post-incident reactive capabilities that guarantee that despite cyber-attacks a device can 
continue its mission and recover a nominal level of performance within specified conditions. 
4.3 Analysis of existing cyber-security certification 
schemes 
4.3.1 The Common Criteria scheme (ISO 15408) 
The Common Criteria is also known as ISO 15408. 
 
The following quotation describes the background of this cyber-security certification scheme. 
 
 
Establishing a Common Criteria 
Common Criteria Certification provides independent, objective validation of the reliability, quality and 
trustworthiness of IT products. It is a standard that customers can rely on to help them make informed decisions 
about their IT purchases. Common Criteria sets specific information assurance goals including strict levels of 
integrity, confidentiality and availability for systems and data, accountability at the individual level, and assurance 
that all goals are met. 
 
The history of Common Criteria 
The Common Criteria is a descendant of the US Department of Defence Trusted Security Evaluation Criteria 
(TCSEC) originally in the 1970s. TCSEC was informally known as the ‘Orange Book’. Several years later Germany 
issued its own version, the Green Book, as did the British and the Canadians. A consolidated European standard 
for security evaluations, known as ITSEC, soon followed. The United States joined the Europeans to develop the 
first version of the international Common Criteria in 1994. The current version of the Common Criteria, 2.1, was 
issued in August 1999. 
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The Common Criteria is also known as ISO 15408. The international community has embraced the Common 
Criteria through the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) whereby the signers have agreed to 
accept the results of Common Criteria evaluations performed by other CCRA members. The National Information 
Assurance Partnership (NIAP) was formed to administer a security evaluation programme in the United States that 
utilises the Common Criteria as the standard for evaluation. 
 
Achieving Common Criteria Certification 
Common Criteria Certification is a rigorous process that includes product testing by a third-party laboratory that 
has been accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) to perform evaluation of 
products against security requirements. Products are tested against functional security requirements based on 
predefined Evaluations Assurance Levels (EALs). 
 
For healthcare, financial services and other industries, the need for security is no less important. Whether they are 
protecting their customers’ privacy, or intellectual and financial assets, assurance that networks, hard drives and 
phone lines are safe and secure from hackers, viruses and other malicious activities is critical. Common Criteria 
Certification, while not a requirement, can provide independent validation. 
 
For more information about Common Criteria, refer to the portal at: 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ 
 
 
The Common Criteria scheme relies upon 11 functionality classes and 8 assurance classes: 
 
Functionality Assurance 
• Security Audit; 
• Cryptographic Support; 
• Communication; 
• User Data Protection; 
• Identification and Authentication; 
• Privacy; 
• Protection of TOE Security Functions; 
• Resource Utilisation; 
• Security Management; 
• TOE Access; 
• Trusted Path/Channels. 
• Protection Profile evaluation; 
• Security Target evaluation; 
• Composition; 
• Development; 
• Guidance Documents; 
• Life Cycle Support; 
• Tests; 
• Vulnerability Assessment.  
 
Each of these is broken down into families and then into components. 
 
7 Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL) are defined: 
• Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) — functionally tested; 
• Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) — structurally tested; 
• Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) — methodically tested and checked; 
• Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) — methodically designed, tested and reviewed; 
• Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) — semi-formally designed and tested; 
• Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) — semi-formally verified design and tested; 
• Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) — formally verified design and tested. 
 
Each EAL (16) requires a specific set of assessments (of assurance classes) and each number (1, 2, etc.) 
in the boxes identifies the corresponding assurance components to assess (if applicable): 
 
                                            
(16) NB: The table here is reproduced from ISO 15408:2007, Section 8.1 (Table 1 — Evaluation assurance level summary). 
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Figure 10 Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Levels 
 
It was a common opinion among the TG’s members that Common Criteria is heavy to apply and too 
costly to be supported by IACS vendors or their clients. Also, it was agreed at the June meeting that the 
certification of vendors’ development lifecycles would not be a burden for them as already much effort 
has been thrust into this area. 
4.3.2 The ISASecure Certification Programme 
ISCI (ISA Security Compliance Institute) is a not-for-profit organisation incorporated by ISA in 2006 to 
provide a home for certification, conformance and compliance assessment activities in the automation 
arena. 
 
Its governing board is comprised of an ISA 99 committee liaison person and four chairmen from Exxon 
Mobil, Honeywell, Chevron and Yokogawa. Invensys (now Schneider Electric) is a strategic member. 
 
The ISASecure certification scheme was derived from the framework of the ISA99 Standards 
Roadmap (17): 
 
                                            
(17) http://isa99.isa.org/ISA99 Wiki/Home.aspx  
Case studies for the cyber-security of IACS 
 
 
 ERNCIP Project 24 
 
Figure 11 ISASecure certification scheme 
 
The ISCI has developed three certifications: 
• Functional Security Assessment (FSA); 
• Software Development Security Assessment (SDSA); 
• Communication Robustness Testing (CRT). 
Functional Security Assessment (FSA) is a set of security functions requirements derived from NIST SP 
800-53. This includes: 
• Access control (access control authorisation, user authentication…); 
• Use control (device authentication, audit trail…); 
• Data integrity; 
• Data confidentiality; 
• Restrict data flow (security function isolation…); 
• Incident response support; 
• Network resource availability (back up, recovery…). 
For each requirement a target level (1, 2, 3) is set. 
 
Software Development Security Assessment (SDSA) is a set of requirements in compliance with: 
• IEC 61508 (SIL level, Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-
related Systems, essentially software requirements); 
• ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation); 
• Microsoft SDLC; 
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• CLASP (Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process) from OWASP which addresses 
applying security to an organisation’s application development process. 
Requirements are split into 12 chapters: 
• PH1 Security Management Process (SMP); 
• PH2 Security Requirements Specification (SRS); 
• PH3 Security Architecture Design (SAD); 
• PH4 Security Risk Assessment and Threat Modelling (SRA); 
• PH5 Detailed Software Design (DSD); 
• PH6 Document Security Guidelines (DSG); 
• PH7 Module Implementation & Verification (MIV); 
• PH8 Security Integration Testing (SIT); 
• PH9 Security Process Verification (SPV); 
• PH10 Security Response Planning (SRP); 
• PH11 Security Validation Testing (SVT); 
• PH12 Security Response Execution (SRE). 
Communication Robustness Testing (CRT) is a set of testing requirements for the following protocols: 
• Ethernet, IP v4, ARP, ICMP v4, UDP, TCP. 
These tests include resistance to attacks such as SYN flood and invalid packets (fuzzing). 
 
ISCI evaluates cyber-security CRT tools to ensure that the tool’s test suites meet the published 
ISASecure EDSA CRT requirements and are capable of consistently executing ISASecure EDSA CRT 
certification tests. They recommend the use of such tools. In Japan, under the name, Japanese 
ISASecure Certification Programme, the Control System Security Centre (CSSC) has been accredited by 
ISCI and developed a cyber-security test bed in 2012 funded by the Japanese Government (METI, 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry). Evaluation, certification and incident analysis will be 
conducted using this test bed. Exida, LLC (a privately held company established in Germany and the US) 
is another ISCI-accredited test laboratory. 
 
The test platforms currently compliant seem to be: 
• Codenomicon (very recent 11.2013) with a product named Defensics X. Codenomicon is privately 
held by private investment funds (Verdane Capital, Prime Technology Ventures); 
• Wurldtech (since 2010) with the Achilles Satellite r3 Level 2. Wurldtech was acquired by GE in 
May 2014. 
The ISA Security Compliance Institute (ISCI) and Wurldtech Security Technologies, Inc. also announced 
in September 2010 the completion of a collaborative project to make the Wurldtech Achilles Level 1™ 
certification test specifications converge with the ISASecure™ Embedded Device Security Assurance 
(EDSA) and communication robustness test (CRT). 
 
However, and with all due precautions, it seems that only a small number of IACS devices have been 
ISASecure certified: 
• 3 from Honeywell Process solutions; 
• 1 from Yokogawa; 
• 1 from RTP Corporation. 
Since February 2014, the ISCI has launched two new certifications: 
• System Security Assurance (SSA); 
• Software Development Lifecycle Assessment (SDLA). 
SSA is a security development process evaluation scheme based on a number of assumptions: 
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• The control system consists of an integrated set of components and includes more than one 
device; 
• The control system is available from and supported as a whole by a single supplier, although it 
may include hardware and software components from several manufacturers; 
• The supplier has assigned a unique product identifier to the control system which the supplier 
uses in the marketplace to refer to the integrated set of components as a whole; 
• The system product is under configuration control and version management. 
SDLA is a certification scheme that assesses a supplier’s product development lifecycle processes for 
industrial automation control systems. An SDLA certification is granted for: 
• A named development organisation or organisations; 
• A specific version of a named, documented development lifecycle process under version control 
that is used by that organisation(s); 
• A certification level of 1, 2, 3 or 4 designed to match SAL in IEC 62443. 
 
The full picture of this in-development ISASecure scheme will then be as indicated in this diagram: 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Development in the ISASecure scheme 
 
4.4 In conclusion: The need for a European IACS 
components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification 
Scheme 
It was the common opinion of the TG Members that Europe should have and implement its own IACS 
components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification Scheme: 
" The idea expressed here was not to create yet another certification standard; 
" Rather, it was to look for what is common to existing standards and to exploit those 
commonalities to create a European IACS certification scheme. 
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Testing and certifying the cyber-security of IACS components/devices seemed to TG members a useful 
step to take as it would bring a higher level of cyber-confidence to industry buyers and users. However 
they know that certified components do not entail that sub-systems and entire industrial systems would 
be cyber-threat free. Engineering cyber-security into those more global levels of IACS architectures 
requires efforts on the part of integrators and industries themselves, which is why the idea of certifying 
sub-systems or systems was discarded by our thematic group. The cyber-security of an entire system 
can hardly be globally certified because it is very much dependent of the environment in which it is 
embedded, each implementation being different. 
 
Vendors agree that today they cannot afford to release products that would not embed a level of cyber-
security sufficient to prevent cyber-attacks, and that this does not generate unbearable extra costs. 
However such testing and certification activities should be performed according to a widely accepted and 
practical scheme guaranteeing mutual recognition of certificates across Europe and compatible with 
similar requirements beyond. In addition, the existence of different domains of industry and of many 
types of systems should not lead to a variety of T&C (18) schemes. And intellectual property over 
industrial devices’ code should not be breached in case of T&C, this being non-negotiable. Should such a 
scheme fail to provide these characteristics, it would engender costs and difficulties that would 
immediately undermine its market value. 
 
Besides, the level of cyber-security maturity of IACS stakeholders varies. For instance, industrial 
operators may not know what to focus on when it comes to making ad hoc decisions or may conversely 
disperse their efforts by attempting to address every single cyber-security issue. Legal responsibilities 
ultimately fall onto industrial operators’ shoulders in case of industrial accidents, whatever the chain of 
contracts binding them to integrators and vendors. National cyber-security authorities should foster the 
adoption of cyber-security dispositions by providing the best possible guidance. Should a testing and 
certification scheme be proposed, it should accommodate vendors who need to put a foot on the first 
step of the certification ladder. It should engage them into progressive improvements of their practices 
towards a capacity to present the market with fully certifiable IACS products. 
 
What this TG recommends is the test and certification of devices, i.e. components found in IACS. Staff 
certification is out of the scope of this TG. And the adoption of IACS cyber-security T&C will be as quick 
as solutions/schemes will be available. 
 
Finally, there were two options for proposing the European Commission an IACS cyber-security testing 
and certification scheme: 
1. Promoting one of the existing standards (ISO 15408 or IEC 62443) as the way forward, 
or 
2. Studying further the question of how T&C could be achieved. 
The market is filled with discussions about which standard should become the reference for market 
players with regards to cyber-security T&C and it was hard to decide in favour of option 1. 
 
Besides, option 2 was suggesting a research into what a ‘European’ scheme could look like. This is the 
way chosen for works carried out in phase 2 of our thematic group. As explained before, the driving 
principle is a priori not to reinvent the wheel and create another standard but to reuse the good 
principles present in existing standards and to seek a documented bridge and compatibility between a 
European IACS certification scheme and existing standards. 
 
                                            
(18) In phase 1, TG members were still referring to T&C (Testing & Certification) rather than to C&C (Compliance & Certification) that emerged 
from work carried out in phase 2. 
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5 Research directions: a proposed EU C&C scheme 
This chapter shows how TG members moved from the idea of a cyber-security testing and certification 
(T&C) scheme towards the proposal of a Compliance & Certification scheme (C&C). 
5.1 A series of initial questions and points 
Gaining a ‘reasonable assurance’ of the cyber security of IACS products seeming to be a good prospect 
to TG members, it was agreed that any such T&C scheme should answer the following initial set of 
requirements and questions: 
 
• A European IACS device Testing & Certification scheme should be voluntary, not legally binding: 
o Undertaken by operators, by vendors or by integrators? 
o Performed through self or third-party assessment? 
o According to what process? By what bodies? Accredited by whom and based on which 
process/standard? 
o What should be the regulatory/legislative conditions? 
o NB: If the idea of a voluntary scheme appeared as a good idea, in certain Member States, 
due to national security regulation or legislation, some industrial components or systems 
would be mandatorily certified for certain markets/customers (e.g. Defence). 
• A European IACS device Testing & Certification scheme should be affordable and quick: 
o What should be the pricing? How long should the whole process take? 
o Not quick for the sake of quickness, of course… 
• A European IACS device Testing & Certification scheme should be based upon an agreed 
standard (to be defined): 
o To gain recognition across Europe and beyond; 
o Which standard? Existing or to be elaborated? 
o Which should be the assessment/test areas? 
! Development process; 
! Code inspection; 
! Vulnerabilities; 
! Unit & Integration-level pen tests; 
o Which levels and scoring method (s)? 
o Tool-facilitated? But which tools? Should tools be qualified/certified/accredited? 
• A European IACS device Testing & Certification scheme should define the conditions of 
publication of the certificates; 
• A European IACS device Testing & Certification scheme should be engaging vendors 
progressively into certification, towards a full capacity to present the market with duly certified 
IACS products. 
The question was also what would make market players buy into the scheme. The experience already 
carried out in the UK, where an online self-assessment service is offered to CI operators who wish to 
assess their governance of cyber-security and gives them anonymous benchmarking facilities, has 
shown that it works well as a factor of market emulation. Germany is just about to adopt a similar 
approach. 
5.2 Assumptions made for the feasibility study 
Three assumptions were made about creating a European IACS device cyber-security T&C scheme: 
1. Assumption 1: a common logic exists among existing cyber-security certification standards; 
2. Assumption 2: a set of common bricks need to be established to create a European T&C scheme; 
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3. Assumption 3: a multi-level scheme is needed to engage stakeholders toward C&C. 
They are presented below and the following section will present the proposed scheme in details. 
5.2.1 Assumption 1: a common logic exists among existing cyber-security 
certification standards 
Different standards, different formulations and different methodological approaches… 
 
Where such differences exist between IEC 62443 and ISO 15408 standards, for instance the creation of 
a European IACS product cyber-security T&C scheme would require that these differences be assessed 
and hopefully resolved. But why and how could they be resolved? 
 
A most fundamental need of European stakeholders of the IACS domain is to level down the amount of 
effort and to assure the mutual recognition of certification. National cyber-security authorities and IACS 
vendors may have already certified some products based on one of these standards and it is hardly 
conceivable to upset past investments. Besides, certifications based on one standard are not equivalent 
to certificates based on the other. And at the present stage of these standards’ development, it becomes 
useful to provide points of comparison to industrial operators, vendors, integrators and national cyber-
security authorities. 
 
The following diagram presents the elements underlying the first assumption: 
 
 
Figure 13 Assumption 1 
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5.2.1.1 There is a common logic of cyber-security engineering in standards 
A target IACS asset (an IACS component/device to be assessed) that needs to be cyber-secured may 
present vulnerabilities that allow potential cyber-attack methods to be used against it. Such 
vulnerabilities must therefore be reduced. The current state of the art has identified: 
• A number of cyber-attack methods, or threats, that exploit known vulnerabilities, and these are 
well documented in at least two classifications available online, the MITRE’s CAPEC and the 
OWASP. 
• A number of cyber-security functional and more technical requirements that, if complied with 
during the development and operation of the component, allow to make the latter cyber-secure. 
They are well described in the IEC 62443 and ISO 15408 standards. 
5.2.1.1.1 Classifications of cyber vulnerabilities and attack methods 
As of June 2014, MITRE’s CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) 
classification (19) identifies 463 cyber-attack patterns. CAPEC is co-sponsored by the US office of Cyber-
security and Communications (20) at the US Department of Homeland Security (21). The website is 
sponsored and managed by the MITRE Corporation (22), a not-for-profit company that operates multiple 
Federally Funded Research and Development Centres (FFRDCs), to enable stakeholder collaboration. 
Cyber threats are classified according to three different criteria and described in minute detail: 
• Domains of attack (23); 
• Mechanisms of attack (24); 
• Attack techniques (25). 
 
Domains of Attack are: 
• Social Engineering — (403 categories); 
• Supply Chain — (437 categories); 
• Communications — (512 categories); 
• Software — (513 categories); 
• Physical Security — (514 categories); 
• Hardware — (515 categories). 
 
Mechanisms of Attack are: 
• Gather Information — (118 categories); 
• Deplete Resources — (119 categories); 
• Injection — (152 categories); 
• Deceptive Interactions — (156 categories); 
• Manipulate Timing and State — (172 categories); 
• Abuse of Functionality — (210 categories); 
• Probabilistic Techniques — (223 categories); 
• Exploitation of Authentication — (225 categories); 
• Exploitation of Authorisation — (232 categories); 
• Manipulate Data Structures — (255 categories); 
• Manipulate Resources — (262 categories); 
• Analyze Target — (281 categories); 
• Gain Physical Access — (436 categories); 
• Malicious Code Execution — (525 categories); 
• Alter System Components — (526 categories); 
• Manipulate System Users — (527 categories). 
 
Attack techniques are: 
• WASC-03 — Integer Overflows;  
                                            
(19) http://capec.mitre.org/  
(20) http://www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-security-and-communications/  
(21) http://www.dhs.gov/  
(22) http://www.mitre.org/  
(23) http://capec.mitre.org/data/graphs/3000.html  
(24) http://capec.mitre.org/data/graphs/1000.html  
(25) http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/333.html  
Case studies for the cyber-security of IACS 
 
 
 ERNCIP Project 31 
• WASC-05 — Remote File Inclusion; 
• WASC-06 — Format String; 
• WASC-07 — Buffer Overflow; 
• WASC-08 — Cross-Site Scripting; 
• WASC-09 — Cross-Site Request Forgery; 
• WASC-10 — Denial of Service; 
• WASC-11 — Brute Force; 
• WASC-12 — Content Spoofing; 
• WASC-18 — Credential/Session Prediction; 
• WASC-19 — SQL Injection; 
• WASC-23 — XML Injection;  
• WASC-24 — HTTP Request Splitting; 
• WASC-25 — HTTP Response Splitting;  
• WASC-26 — HTTP Request Smuggling;  
• WASC-27 — HTTP Response Smuggling; 
• WASC-28 — Null Byte Injection; 
• WASC-29 — LDAP Injection; 
• WASC-30 — Mail Command Injection; 
• WASC-31 — OS Commanding; 
• WASC-32 — Routing Detour; 
• WASC-33 — Path Traversal;  
• WASC-34 — Predictable Resource Location;  
• WASC-35 — SOAP Array Abuse; 
• WASC-36 — SSI Injection;  
• WASC-37 — Session Fixation;  
• WASC-38 — URL Redirector Abuse;  
• WASC-39 — XPath Injection; 
• WASC-41 — XML Attribute Blowup; 
• WASC-42 — Abuse of Functionality; 
• WASC-43 — XML External Entities;  
• WASC-44 — XML Entity Expansion;  
• WASC-45 — Fingerprinting;  
• WASC-46 — XQuery Injection. 
 
The OWASP (26) (Open Web Application Security Project) is a worldwide not-for-profit charitable 
organisation focused on improving the security of software. Their website is an open wiki. The OWASP 
community offers, among other things: 
• A cyber-attack techniques wiki (27) somehow similar to CAPEC attack techniques; 
• A cyber-security testing guide applicable in development projects (28); 
• A set of generic attack detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web 
application (29); 
• The OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) Project that provides a basis for 
testing web application technical security controls (30); 
• Etc. 
5.2.1.1.2 Classifications of cyber-security functional requirements 
The IEC 62443 standard identifies the following functional and associated technical requirements: 
 
Functional Requirements Associated System Requirements 
FR 1 — Access control 
 
SR 1.1 — IACS user identification and authentication 
SR 1.2 — Account management 
SR 1.3 — Access enforcement 
SR 1.4 — Identifier management 
SR 1.5 — Authenticator management 
                                            
(26) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page  
(27) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:Attack  
(28) https://www.owasp.org/images/5/52/OWASP_Testing_Guide_v4.pdf  
(29) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project  
(30) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Application_Security_Verification_Standard_Project  
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SR 1.6 — Authenticator feedback 
SR 1.7 — Unsuccessful login attempts 
SR 1.8 — System use notification 
SR 1.9 — Previous logon notification 
SR 1.10 — Session lock 
SR 1.11 — Remote session termination 
SR 1.12 — Remote access 
SR 1.13 — Device identification and authentication 
FR 2 — Use control 
 
SR 2.1 — Wireless access restrictions 
SR 2.2 — Use control for portable and mobile devices 
SR 2.3 — Mobile code 
SR 2.4 — Concurrent session control 
SR 2.5 — Auditable events 
SR 2.6 — Audit storage capacity 
SR 2.7 — Response to audit processing failures 
SR 2.8 — Time stamps 
SR 2.9 — Protection of audit information 
SR 2.10 — Non-repudiation 
FR 3 — Data integrity 
 
SR 3.1 — Communication integrity 
SR 3.2 — Malicious code protection 
SR 3.3 — Security functionality verification 
SR 3.4 — Software and information integrity 
SR 3.5 — E-mail use in the control system 
SR 3.6 — Information input restrictions 
SR 3.7 — Information integrity and authenticity 
SR 3.8 — Error handling 
SR 3.9 — Session authenticity 
FR 4 — Data confidentiality 
 
SR 4.1 — Information persistence 
SR 4.2 — Communication confidentiality 
SR 4.3 — Cryptographic key establishment and management 
SR 4.4 — Use of cryptography 
SR 4.5 — Public key infrastructure certificates 
FR 5 — Restrict data flow 
 
SR 5.1 — Information flow enforcement 
SR 5.2 — Application partitioning 
SR 5.3 — Security function isolation 
SR 5.4 — Boundary protection 
FR 6 — Timely response to an event 
 
SR 6.1 — Audit reduction and report generation 
SR 6.2 — IACS monitoring tools and techniques  
FR 7 — Resource availability 
 
SR 7.1 — Denial of service protection 
SR 7.2 — Management of network resources 
SR 7.3 — IACS backup 
SR 7.4 — IACS recovery and reconstitution 
SR 7.5 — Emergency power 
SR 7.6 — Network and security configuration settings 
SR 7.7 — Least functionality 
SR 7.8 — IACS component inventory 
 
This is to be compared to ISO 15408:2005/Common Criteria — Part 2: Security Functional Components 
that defines the following security functional requirements in relation to target systems under 
evaluation: 
 
Security Classes Security Functional Components 
1 CLASS FAU: SECURITY AUDIT 
 
1.1 Security audit automatic response (FAU_ARP) 
1.2 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 
1.3 Security audit analysis (FAU_SAA) 
1.4 Security audit review (FAU_SAR) 
1.5 Security audit event selection (FAU_SEL) 
1.6 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 
2 CLASS FCO: COMMUNICATION 2.1 Non-repudiation of origin (FCO_NRO) 
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 2.2 Non-repudiation of receipt (FCO_NRR)  
3 CLASS FCS: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT  3.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 
3.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP)  
4 CLASS FDP: USER DATA PROTECTION 
 
4.1 Access control policy (FDP_ACC) 
4.2 Access control functions (FDP_ACF) 
4.3 Data authentication (FDP_DAU) 
4.4 Export from the TOE (FDP_ETC) 
4.5 Information flow control policy (FDP_IFC) 
4.6 Information flow control functions (FDP_IFF) 
4.7 Import from outside of the TOE (FDP_ITC) 
4.8 Internal TOE transfer (FDP_ITT) 
4.9 Residual information protection (FDP_RIP) 
4.10 Rollback (FDP_ROL) 
4.11 Stored data integrity (FDP_SDI) 
4.12 Inter-TSF user data confidentiality transfer protection (FDP_UCT) 
4.13 Inter-TSF user data integrity transfer protection (FDP_UIT) 
5 CLASS FIA: IDENTIFICATION AND 
AUTHENTICATION 
 
5.1 Authentication failures (FIA_AFL) 
5.2 User attribute definition (FIA_ATD) 
5.3 Specification of secrets (FIA_SOS) 
5.4 User authentication (FIA_UAU) 
5.5 User identification (FIA_UID) 
5.6 User-subject binding (FIA_USB)  
6 CLASS FMT: SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
 
6.1 Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF) 
6.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA) 
6.3 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD) 
6.4 Revocation (FMT_REV) 
6.5 Security attribute expiration (FMT_SAE) 
6.6 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF) 
6.7 Security management roles (FMT_SMR) 
7 CLASS FPR: PRIVACY 
 
7.1 Anonymity (FPR_ANO) 
7.2 Pseudonymity (FPR_PSE) 
7.3 Unlinkability (FPR_UNL) 
7.4 Unobservability (FPR_UNO)  
8 CLASS FPT: PROTECTION OF THE TSF 
 
8.1 Fail secure (FPT_FLS) 
8.2 Availability of exported TSF data (FPT_ITA) 
8.3 Confidentiality of exported TSF data (FPT_ITC) 
8.4 Integrity of exported TSF data (FPT_ITI) 
8.5 Internal TOE TSF data transfer (FPT_ITT) 
8.6 TSF physical protection (FPT_PHP) 
8.7 Trusted recovery (FPT_RCV) 
8.8 Replay detection (FPT_RPL) 
8.9 State synchrony protocol (FPT_SSP) 
8.10 Time stamps (FPT_STM) 
8.11 Inter-TSF TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC) 
8.12 Testing of external entities (FPT_TEE) 
8.13 Internal TOE TSF data replication consistency (FPT_TRC) 
8.14 TSF self-test (FPT_TST)  
9 CLASS FRU: RESOURCE UTILISATION 
 
9.1 Fault tolerance (FRU_FLT) 
9.2 Priority of service (FRU_PRS) 
9.3 Resource allocation (FRU_RSA)  
10 CLASS FTA: TOE ACCESS 
 
10.1 Limitation on scope of selectable attributes (FTA_LSA) 
10.2 Limitation on multiple concurrent sessions (FTA_MCS) 
10.3 Session locking and termination (FTA_SSL) 
10.4 TOE access banners (FTA_TAB) 
10.5 TOE access history (FTA_TAH) 
10.6 TOE session establishment (FTA_TSE)  
11 CLASS FTP: TRUSTED 
PATH/CHANNELS  
11.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC) 
11.2 Trusted path (FTP_TRP) 
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These methods also define, though differently, security targets for specific devices and protection 
profiles for generic families of devices, i.e. for product lines. Such profiles determine which types of 
security requirements must be provided to a device or family of devices to reach a target level of cyber-
security. 
5.2.1.2 There is a common logic of cyber-security testing and certification 
In the same two standards, cyber-security evaluations rely also on similar concepts: 
• The identification/characterisation of the target of evaluation (TOE) (31), including its context of 
operation; 
• The assessment of the TOE’s vulnerabilities; 
• The definition of a target level of cyber-security for the TOE (32); 
• The assessment of how the TOE responds to the cyber-security requirements that need to be 
complied with at the target level of cyber-security of the TOE; 
• Complementary robustness tests, like penetration tests; 
• This may also include the assessment of the development and operating process, this involving 
an assessment of the product’s architecture, its documentation, lifecycle support and 
maintenance. 
The following picture shows some of these potential correspondences between security requirements 
promoted by the two standards: 
 
                                            
(31) TOE: this terminology is proposed by ISO 15408 / Common Criteria. This reference to Common Criteria does not express a prejudice in 
favour of this standard. 
(32) In ISO 15408 this corresponds to EALs (Evaluation Assurance Levels). 
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Figure 14 Potential correspondences between security requirements promoted by standards 
 
5.2.2 Assumption 2: a set of common bricks must be established to create 
a European T&C scheme 
In order to bring all parties to an agreement on a European IACS cyber-security testing and certification 
scheme, the second assumption we made was that the industrial community should agree on: 
• A common classification of vulnerabilities and attack methods and techniques; 
• A common classification of security requirements; 
• A common process for testing & certification. 
This is summarised in the following diagram: 
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Figure 15 Assumption 2 
5.2.3 Assumption 3: a multi-level scheme is needed to engage 
stakeholders towards C&C 
 
Our third assumption was derived from the discussions held during the thematic group’s meetings. It is 
the idea that as vendors, integrators and operators altogether have not necessarily reached full maturity 
with regard to cyber-security, in particular when it comes to certification, it is mandatory to reflect on 
how to engage them into a virtuous process of improvement in those areas. 
 
Combined with ENISA’s findings recalled earlier about the fact that experts thought a mandatory 
certification scheme was not appropriate, we assumed that if vendors of IACS products/components 
could in the first place assess their compliance with a set of standard cyber-security requirements that 
all devices should satisfy, and if such an assessment was in easy reach then they could adhere to the 
scheme and take their first step towards proper certification. 
 
Besides, the central question in a testing and certification scheme is one of trust: 
• A basic self-assessment for instance only tells clients that the vendor has checked the compliance 
of a product with a shared set of requirements; 
• When the same assessment is performed by an independent, accredited third party, clients are 
certain of the rigour of the assessment process and of the objectivity of the evaluation of the 
product; 
• If, beyond only a formal assessment, ‘on paper’, a trusted third party tests the cyber-robustness 
of the product to check if it resists a set of commonly agreed tests, like penetration tests; 
• And beyond, assessing the development, operation and maintenance processes associated with 
the evaluated IACS product gives clients even greater confidence in its cyber-security. 
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Besides, existing cyber-security certification standards associate requirements to target levels of cyber-
security. ISO 15408 standard promotes two approaches to the specification of cyber-security 
requirements: 
• Protection Profiles (PP): describes a type of targets of evaluation (TOE), e.g. ‘firewalls’ in 
general; 
• Security Target (ST): describes a given TOE, e.g. the MinuteGap v18.5 firewall says ISO 
15408:2005 (p. 40). 
ANSSI’s First level security Certification (CSPN) (33) makes certification start from a security target 
defined in terms of ‘the use for which the product was designed and a description of who is meant to 
use it and in what context; the technical environment in which the product runs (computer model, 
operating system, etc.); the sensitive assets that the product must protect; the threats against which 
the product offers protection; the security features implemented by the product to counter the identified 
threats. These features will be the subject of the evaluation’. 
 
TG members retained the idea of a generic product profile defined in terms of: 
• A type of IACS products; 
• A standard configuration of the product; 
• An operating and access context and protocol; 
• A target level of cyber-security requested by a class of buyers; 
• A capacity to withstand attacks by adversaries equipped with a certain power of attack. 
5.3 In conclusion: a four-level Compliance & Certification 
scheme 
Four levels of compliance assessment and certification were defined out of these assumptions: 
1. Level 1: self- declaration of compliance; 
2. Level 2: third-party compliance assessment; 
3. Level 3: third-party product certification; 
4. Level 4: third-party full certification. 
The following diagram summarises these four levels: 
 
 
Figure 16 Four levels of compliance assessment and certification 
 
This process of progressive improvement of their practices would help vendors to enhance their current 
quality assurance practices into a proper practice of cyber-security engineering and certification. 
                                            
(33) http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/certification/first-level-security-certification-cspn/  
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5.4 Detailed description of the proposed C&C scheme 
Each level can be described according to the following criteria: 
 
Elements	  of	  the	  C&C	  process	   Description	  
Product	  characterisation	   The	  scheme’s	  level	  includes	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  product’s	  cyber-­‐security	  profile	  
Threats	  &	  Vulnerabilities	  assessment	   The	  scheme’s	  level	  includes	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  product’s	  vulnerabilities	  
Development	  process	   The	  scheme’s	  level	  includes	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  product’s	  development	  (
34)	  
process	  
Cyber-­‐security	  requirements	   The	  scheme’s	  level	  includes	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  product’s	  cyber-­‐security	  requirements	  
Cyber-­‐robustness	  tests	   The	  scheme’s	  level	  includes	  the	  performance	  of	  tests	  aiming	  at	  proving	  that	  the	  product	  effectively	  delivers	  the	  level	  of	  cyber-­‐security	  specified	  in	  its	  profile	  
Characteristics	   Description	  
GENERAL	  PRINCIPLE	   What	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  is	  intended	  to	  deliver	  
DEFINITION	   What	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  is	  
POTENTIAL	  COST	   What	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  may	  cost	  to	  a	  vendor	  (expressed	  in	  broad	  terms)	  
CONSTRAINTS/LIMITS	   What	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  requires	  and	  the	  difficulties	  potentially	  associated	  with	  it	  
CERTIFICATE	  VALIDITY	   What	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  certificate	  is	  valid	  for	  
MUTUAL	  RECOGNITION	   The	  conditions	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  certificate	  
USEFULNESS	   What	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  provides	  to	  industry	  users	  
NORM	  OF	  REFERENCE	   What	  standard	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  relies	  upon	  
PROCESS	   Who	  does	  the	  assessment	  
PUBLICATION	  OF	  CERTIFICATE	   The	  regime	  of	  publication/publicity	  of	  the	  certification	  
LEGAL	  REGIME	   The	  legal	  implications	  of	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  certificate	  
RISKS	   The	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  
OPPORTUNITIES	   The	  opportunities	  associated	  with	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  scheme’s	  level	  
 
The following sections provide the arguments agreed upon by TG members. These arguments must be 
interpreted as basic, initial elements of description of each level and orientations that must be further 
studied in the next phase of the ERNCIP programme. 
5.4.1 Level 1: self-declaration of compliance 
 
IACS	  component	  C&C	  Scheme	  
(Research	  directions)	  
LEVEL	  1:	  SELF-­‐DECLARATION	  OF	  COMPLIANCE	  
(based	  on	  a	  generic	  product	  profile)	  
Product	  characterisation	   YES	  
Threats	  &	  Vulnerabilities	  assessment	   	  	  
Development	  process	   	  	  
Cyber-­‐security	  requirements	   YES	  
Cyber	  robustness	  tests	   	  	  
GENERAL	  PRINCIPLE	   Meeting	  all	  cyber-­‐security	  requirements	  for	  a	  given	  Security	  Profile	  
DEFINITION	   A	  PRODUCT’S	  SECURITY	  PROFILE	  assessed	  on	  paper	  based	  on	  a	  generic	  product	  type’s	  protection	  profile	  
POTENTIAL	  COST	   Inexpensive	  (IACS	  cyber-­‐security	  assessment	  management	  system)	  
CONSTRAINTS/LIMITS	  
Redo	  the	  assessment	  for	  each	  version	  to	  assess	  a	  product	  generically	  (the	  
standard	  must	  allow	  this	  then)	  
Products	  have	  a	  very	  long	  lifecycle	  =>	  certificates’	  maintenance	  to	  be	  studied	  
CERTIFICATE	  VALIDITY	   A	  product	  version	  or	  line	  (and	  its	  upgrades	  if	  the	  standard	  permits)	  
MUTUAL	  RECOGNITION	   Based	  on	  a	  shared	  European	  IACS	  Cyber-­‐security	  Certification	  Standard	  
USEFULNESS	   To	  know	  which	  security	  level	  the	  product	  is	  engineered	  for	  
NORM	  OF	  REFERENCE	   European	  IACS	  Cyber-­‐security	  Certification	  Standard	  
PROCESS	   Self-­‐assessment	  based	  on	  a	  specified	  process	  
PUBLICATION	  
COMPLIANCE	  DECLARATION	  could	  be	  posted	  on	  a	  European	  cyber-­‐security	  
IACS	  Certification	  Register	  
Visual	  label	  showing	  the	  level	  (1	  to	  4)	  of	  the	  product	  
                                            
(34) By development we mean the engineering, production, installation, operation and maintenance processes. 
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LEGAL	  REGIME	   Declarative	  under	  professional	  IACS	  associations’	  monitoring	  
RISKS	  
No	  short-­‐term	  agreement	  on	  a	  standard	  leading	  to	  no	  European	  mutual	  
recognition	  
Professional	  IACS	  associations	  do	  not	  endorse	  the	  scheme	  
OPPORTUNITIES	  
Standards	   convergence	   reveals	   feasibility:	   cyber-­‐security	   requirements	   and	  
measures	   are	   fairly	   homogenously	   documented	   across	   them	  
(ISA/CC	  (35)/NIST…)	  
 
5.4.2 Level 2: third-party compliance assessment 
 
IACS	  component	  C&C	  Scheme	  
(Research	  directions)	  
LEVEL	  2:	  THIRD-­‐PARTY	  COMPLIANCE	  ASSESSMENT	  
(based	  on	  a	  generic	  product	  profile)	  
Product	  characterisation	   YES	  
Threats	  &	  Vulnerabilities	  assessment	   	  	  
Development	  process	   	  	  
Cyber-­‐security	  requirements	   YES	  
Cyber	  robustness	  tests	   	  	  
GENERAL	  PRINCIPLE	   Assurance	  of	  meeting	  all	  cyber-­‐security	  requirements	  for	  a	  given	  Security	  Profile	  
DEFINITION	   A	  product’s	  security	  profile	  assessed	  on	  paper,	  based	  on	  a	  generic	  product	  type’s	  protection	  profile	  
POTENTIAL	  COST	   Low	  cost	  (IACS	  cyber-­‐security	  assessment	  management	  system	  +	  audit	  cost)	  
CONSTRAINTS/LIMITS	  
Redo	  assessment	  for	  each	  version	  to	  assess	  a	  product	  generically	  (the	  standard	  
must	  allow	  this	  then)	  
Products	  have	  a	  very	  long	  lifecycle	  =>	  certificates’	  maintenance	  to	  be	  studied	  
CERTIFICATE	  VALIDITY	   A	  product	  version	  or	  line	  (and	  its	  upgrades	  if	  standard	  permits)	  
MUTUAL	  RECOGNITION	   Based	  on	  a	  shared	  European	  IACS	  Cyber-­‐security	  Certification	  Standard	  
USEFULNESS	   To	  know	  which	  security	  level	  the	  product	  is	  engineered	  for	  
NORM	  OF	  REFERENCE	   European	  IACS	  Cyber-­‐security	  Certification	  Standard	  
PROCESS	   Assessment	  by	  an	  accredited	  independent	  third-­‐party	  
PUBLICATION	  
Compliance	  declaration	  could	  be	  posted	  on	  a	  European	  Cyber-­‐security	  IACS	  
Certification	  Register	  
Visual	  label	  showing	  the	  level	  (1	  to	  4)	  of	  the	  product	  
LEGAL	  REGIME	   Declarative	  under	  professional	  IACS	  associations’	  monitoring	  
RISKS	  
No	  short-­‐term	  agreement	  on	  a	  standard	  leading	  to	  no	  European	  mutual	  
recognition	  
Professional	  IACS	  associations	  do	  not	  endorse	  the	  scheme	  
Other	  European	  activities	  competing	  with	  JRC’s	  projects	  
OPPORTUNITIES	   Standards	  convergence	  reveals	  feasibility:	  cyber-­‐security	  requirements	  and	  measures	  are	  fairly	  homogenously	  documented	  across	  them	  (ISA/CC/NIST…)	  
 
5.4.3 Level 3: third-party product certification 
 
IACS	  component	  C&C	  Scheme	  
(Research	  directions)	  
LEVEL	  3:	  THIRD-­‐PARTY	  PRODUCT	  CERTIFICATION	  	  
(Same	  as	  L2	  +	  Robustness	  tests)	  
Product	  characterisation	   YES	  
Threats	  &	  Vulnerabilities	  assessment	   YES	  
Development	  process	   	  	  
Cyber-­‐security	  requirements	   YES	  
Cyber	  robustness	  tests	   YES	  
GENERAL	  PRINCIPLE	   Verification	  of	  TOE’s	  cyber-­‐security	  robustness	  
DEFINITION	   A	  product’s	  security	  profile	  and	  robustness	  tests	  Certifies	  the	  product	  out	  of	  the	  box	  
POTENTIAL	  COST	   Reasonably	  expensive	  
                                            
(35) Common Criteria 
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CONSTRAINTS/LIMITS	   Products	  have	  a	  very	  long	  lifecycle	  =>	  certificates’	  maintenance	  to	  be	  studied	  An	  automaton	  device	  is	  not	  just	  a	  box	  but	  often	  a	  system	  =>	  difficulty	  +	  cost	  
CERTIFICATE	  VALIDITY	   A	  product	  version	  (and	  its	  upgrades	  if	  the	  standard	  permits)	  
MUTUAL	  RECOGNITION	   Based	  on	  a	  shared	  European	  IACS	  Cyber-­‐security	  Certification	  Standard	  and	  a	  Robustness	  Testing	  standard	  (TBD)	  
USEFULNESS	   To	  know	  which	  security	  level	  the	  product	  effectively	  reaches	  
NORM	  OF	  REFERENCE	   European	  IACS	  Cyber-­‐security	  Certification	  Standard	  
PROCESS	   Third-­‐party	  accredited	  by	  national	  cyber-­‐security	  authority	  
PUBLICATION	  
Certificate	  could	  be	  posted	  on	  a	  European	  Cyber-­‐security	  IACS	  Certification	  
Register	  +	  National	  agency	  
Visual	  label	  showing	  the	  level	  (1	  to	  4)	  of	  the	  product	  
LEGAL	  REGIME	   LEGAL	  RECOGNITION	  (possible	  because	  of	  certification	  +	  a	  user’s	  acceptable	  means	  of	  compliance)	  
RISKS	   No	  short-­‐term	  agreement	  on	  L2	  certificates	  European	  mutual	  recognition	  No	  short-­‐term	  development	  of	  L3	  standards	  and	  processes	  
OPPORTUNITIES	   Standards	  convergence	  reveals	  feasibility:	  cyber-­‐security	  requirements	  and	  measures	  are	  fairly	  homogenously	  documented	  across	  them	  (ISA/CC/NIST…)	  
 
5.4.4 Level 4: third-party full certification 
 
IACS	  component	  C&C	  Scheme	  
(Research	  directions)	  
LEVEL	  4:	  THIRD-­‐PARTY	  FULL	  CERTIFICATION	  	  
(Same	  as	  L3	  +	  Process	  certification)	  
Product	  characterisation	   YES	  
Threats	  &	  Vulnerabilities	  assessment	   YES	  
Development	  process	   YES	  
Cyber-­‐security	  requirements	   YES	  
Cyber	  robustness	  tests	   YES	  
GENERAL	  PRINCIPLE	   Verification	  of	  TOE’s	  cyber-­‐security	  robustness	  plus	  evidence	  of	  TOE’s	  cyber-­‐security	  development	  good	  practices	  
DEFINITION	   Security	  profile	  assessment	  +	  robustness	  tests	  +	  process	  certification	  certifies	  the	  product	  and	  the	  process	  
POTENTIAL	  COST	   More	  expensive	  
CONSTRAINTS/LIMITS	   Products	  have	  a	  very	  long	  lifecycle	  =>	  certificate’s	  maintenance	  is	  to	  be	  studied	  Also:	  an	  automaton	  device	  is	  not	  just	  a	  box	  but	  often	  a	  system	  =>	  difficulty	  +	  cost	  
CERTIFICATE	  VALIDITY	   A	  product	  version	  (and	  its	  upgrades	  if	  the	  standard	  permits)	  
MUTUAL	  RECOGNITION	   Same	  as	  L3	  +	  a	  Process	  certification	  standard	  
USEFULNESS	   To	  know	  which	  security	  level	  the	  product	  effectively	  reaches	  in	  a	  context	  for	  which	  product	  and	  process	  certification	  is	  mandatory	  
NORM	  OF	  REFERENCE	   Common	  Criteria?	  
PROCESS	   Third-­‐party	  accredited	  by	  national	  cyber-­‐security	  authority	  
PUBLICATION	  
CERTIFICATE	  on	  the	  European	  Cyber-­‐security	  IACS	  Certification	  Register	  +	  National	  
agency	  
Visual	  label	  showing	  the	  level	  (1	  to	  4)	  of	  the	  product	  
LEGAL	  REGIME	   LEGAL	  RECOGNITION	  (possible	  because	  of	  product	  certification	  +	  a	  user’s	  acceptable	  means	  of	  compliance)	  
RISKS	   CC	  too	  complex	  and	  impossibility	  to	  define	  a	  lighter	  version	  of	  CC	  Suppliers	  not	  ready	  to	  disclose	  their	  processes	  
OPPORTUNITIES	  
Demands	  from	  protected	  sectors	  (defence,	  etc.)?…	  
Standards	  convergence	  reveals	  feasibility:	  cyber-­‐security	  requirements	  and	  
measures	  are	  fairly	  homogenously	  documented	  across	  them	  (ISA/CC/NIST…)	  
 
5.5 In conclusion 
The findings of the TG’s phase 2 work are that a four-level European IACS components Cyber-security 
Compliance & Certification Scheme and its broad characteristics should be developed. 
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These findings constitute an initial proposal with regards to IACS’ cyber-security. 
 
This proposal now requires further work in order to be shared, further defined, developed and fostered 
across Europe. 
 
The next chapter presents the corresponding research and action plan and its rationale and concepts. 
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6 A research and action plan for 2015-20 
6.1 Concepts and rationale of the proposed C&C scheme 
The proposed European IACS components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification Scheme relies upon 
a number of concepts and assumptions. They also inform the rationale of the research and action plan 
proposed for the 2015-20 period: 
1. The proposed plan mixes research projects and practical projects and those might be conducted 
either by the EC, or by other European Institutions, including the CEN and other standardisation 
bodies. The plan does not make any recommendation about who should do what. 
2. The first step to take is to enquire about IACS stakeholders’ opinions and, based on the results of 
this enquiry, to define in detail, organise and schedule further projects suggested in the plan. 
3. The creation of a European IACS product register should be further specified and developed. 
4. Common cyber-security requirements would be needed for the assessment of IACS products if 
no agreement was reached about the choice of a standard shared among EU MS and 
stakeholders. These should be created out of existing standards such as IEC 62443, ISO 15408, 
etc. this project should cover a common classification of cyber-security vulnerabilities and attack 
methods (which could be inspired by MITRE CAPEC and OWASP classifications), cyber-security 
functional and technical requirements, target levels of cyber-security and their contexts of 
applications, cyber robustness tests, development process characteristics and good practices. 
5. IACS product standard cyber-security profiles are needed to further specify target levels of cyber-
security and requirements. The French ANSSI’s protection profiles (36) and similar initiatives 
should be analysed as a possible reference for this project, as well as the concepts of ISO 15408 
protection profiles. 
6. A common European process for IACS cyber-security compliance assessment and certification 
should be defined. IEC 62443/ISASecure and ISO 15408/Common Criteria guidelines should be a 
primary source of inspiration. 
7. A transition and implementation plan is required. Implementation refers to the actions to be 
taken on a European scale in order to make the C&C scheme become a reality. Transition refers 
to the assistance to be provided to vendors, integrators and industry operators as to how to 
implement the C&C scheme and to prepare for it. This includes preparing the launch of the 
scheme. 
8. Once the prior transition and implementation plan established the official launch of the scheme 
should be done. 
The following section summarises the research and action plan proposed for 2015-20. 
6.2 A research and action plan for 2015-20 
The proposed plan is made of seven projects: 
1. Stakeholders consultation and project planning 
2. Product Register development 
3. Cyber-security Common Requirements project 
4. Standard Security Profiles project 
5. Compliance & Certification Process project 
6. Transition & Implementation Plan 
7. Launch of the C&C Scheme. 
 
                                            
(36) http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/products/protection-profiles/  
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Figure 17 The research and action plan for 2015-20 
 
Project No 1 is a key priority and will confirm and frame the rest of the plan. 
 
Projects No 3, No 4 and No 5 could be conducted in parallel. In order to take advantage of a window of 
opportunity for Europe to develop its own scheme, they should be carried out by beginning or mid-2016. 
Today, IACS suppliers are ready to follow such a European scheme as existing standards are not yet 
widely adopted. Some participants wish that projects Nos 3 to 6 will be finished mid-2016. Project No 2 
could be conducted either in parallel with projects Nos 3 to 5 or after. Project No 6 can be performed 
only after actions No 2 and No 5. This schedule, however, will be refined in project No 1 to take account 
of all possible goals, options and constraints. 
 
Vendors, policy-makers and manufacturers (industry operators) must be involved in these projects. 
 
The following GANTT planning summarises the schedule initially proposed for the seven projects: 
 
 
Figure 18 Schedule of the research and action plan for 2015-20 
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6.3 Initial specification of the projects 
6.3.1 Project No 1: Stakeholders consultation & project planning 
Goal: To verify the stakeholders’ interest for the European IACS components Cyber-security Compliance 
& Certification Scheme proposal, their constraints and priorities, and to detail the plan for the 
subsequent six projects. 
 
NB: This is a short project that could be established as an ERNCIP Thematic Group to be started 
soon and run in early 2015 in order to allow projects 2 to 5 to fit into their window of 
opportunity. 
 
Method: This project should a priori include the following steps: 
1. The identification of a wider group of IACS, cyber-security and cyber-security certification expert 
bodies, companies and people in order to provide future 2015-20 projects with possibilities to 
collect, analyse and discuss IACS cyber-security C&C related data and findings; 
2. An enquiry about the TG’s proposals for the European IACS components Cyber-security 
Compliance & Certification Scheme in order to validate and comment on them more widely than 
among the initial circle of our TG members; 
3. A possible amendment of our initial proposals should the enquiry bring useful recommendations; 
4. The detailed specification and organisation of the next six projects, along with their intended 
scheduling and refined budget estimate; 
5. The practical launch of these following six projects through the organisation of one or several 
thematic groups, or call for proposals, or partnerships with institutions, companies or experts, 
including an ERNCIP conference. 
6.3.2 Project No 2: Product Register development 
Goal: To provide users with an EC-managed database of C&C evaluated IACS products. 
 
Method: This project should a priori include the following steps: 
1. General design; 
2. Specification and design; 
3. Development and testing; 
4. Implementation and trials under EC’s control; 
5. Review; 
6. Finalisation by the EC. 
6.3.3 Project No 3: Cyber-security Common Requirements 
Goal: To extract from existing standards common good practices and requirements and to organise 
them into a common classification covering an agreed set of domains of C&C: the assessment of cyber-
security engineering practices, vulnerabilities assessment, development process assessment and cyber 
robustness testing, etc. 
 
Method: This project should a priori include the following steps: 
1. Definition of the project’s scope, goals and orientations: this step should define what domains of 
good practices and requirements shall be included (assessment of cyber-security engineering 
practices, vulnerabilities assessment, development process assessment and cyber robustness 
testing, etc.); 
2. Review of up to three cyber-security certification standards: these should include IEC 
62443/ISASecure, ISO 15408/Common Criteria and possibly a NIST or equivalent reference; 
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3. Comparison of cyber-security certification standards: it will aim at establishing which good 
practices and requirements are common to standards of reference as well as gaps and 
explanation of gaps; 
4. Definition of a list of common cyber-security requirements: in each selected domain, Common 
cyber-security Good Practices and Requirements will include the best ones found in standards of 
reference and will sort them according to a Common Classification; 
5. Discussion and validation of cyber-security requirements. 
6.3.4 Project No 4: Generic IACS Cyber-security Profiles 
Goal: To define Generic IACS Cyber-security Profiles including classes of IACS products and target levels 
of cyber-security, operating and security environments, etc. 
 
Method: This project should a priori include the following steps: 
1. Definition of the project’s scope, goals and orientations: this step should include the definition of 
the notion of Protection Profile and how they are intended to be used in the C&C scheme; 
2. Review of existing notions of generic Protection Profiles (PP) and specific Security Targets (TS) in 
existing standards, guidelines and good practices: this should include the standards of reference 
from Project No 2 as well as the guidelines provided by MS national cyber-security authorities; 
3. Proposition of a common definition of Generic IACS Cyber-security Profiles (GICP): this should 
include at least such elements as a conceptual definition articulated with complementary 
concepts, a description of contents, a context and method of application, the particulars of an 
application to at least the five types of IACS products identified in the IACS case studies TG; 
4. Discussion of proposed GICPs: this should involve stakeholders (as defined in Project No 1); 
5. Amendment of the propositions, taking remarks into account; 
6. Validation of GICPs with TG members. 
6.3.5 Project No 5: Compliance & Certification Process 
Goal: To define a common process for each of the four levels of the proposed European IACS 
components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification Scheme. 
 
Method: This project should a priori include the following steps: 
1. Definition of the project’s scope, goals and orientations: the scope should include the definition 
of the target of evaluation, the assessment of cyber-security engineering practices, vulnerabilities 
assessment, development process assessment and cyber robustness testing domains; 
2. Definition of each C&C level’s process, including the who, what, why, how and when criteria for 
the framing and preparation stage, the data collection and verification stage, the data analysis 
stage and certificate delivery stage, as well as for certificates’ maintenance, certificate renewal 
activities, etc.; 
3. Discussion and validation of C&C processes; 
4. Amendments of processes. 
6.3.6 Project No 6: Transition & Implementation Plan 
Goal: To define how the European Commission, and first of all maybe the DG JRC, and stakeholders (in 
particular vendors, but also integrators and users) will implement the proposed European IACS 
components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification Scheme and what kind of support will be required 
to that end. 
 
Method: This project should a priori include the following steps: 
1. Definition of the scope, goals and structuring elements of the C&C scheme’s implementation 
plan; 
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2. Gap analysis between stakeholders’ current practices and those required for the implementation 
of the C&C scheme: this step should include building on the development of good practices 
elaborated in project No 3; 
3. Definition of a baseline transition plan for vendors, integrators and users to enhance their 
practices: this plan should be founded upon the gaps previously identified; 
4. Discussion and validation of the transition plan with stakeholders, possibly through an ERNCIP 
conference: these discussions may be followed by amendments of the original plan; 
5. Definition of a European C&C implementation plan: this plan should include legislative and 
regulations aspects if needed (37), standardisation if still required (38), awareness raising, financial 
incentives planning for instance, etc.; 
6. Presentation and negotiation of the implementation plan with European Institutions. 
6.3.7 Project No 7: Launch of the C&C Scheme 
Goal: To plan how to promote the European IACS components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification 
Scheme, to run, support and assess the plan. 
Method: This project should a priori include the following steps: 
1. C&C fostering activities undertaken by the European Commission/DG JRC: this may take the form 
of an annual ERNCIP conference during the 2020-25 period, publications, IACS products’ Cyber-
security C&C awareness weeks or challenges during the same period of time, etc.; 
2. Monitoring of implementation activities undertaken by European Institutions and stakeholders: 
this may involve indicators, surveys, working in partnership with ENISA or other European or 
professional Institutions, etc.; 
3. Reporting activities: activities internal to the JRC and the European Commission. 
 
 
                                            
(37) It may be the case that law/regulations enforcement may have to be envisaged at this point, for instance. 
(38) It would be best to plan and foster standardisation activities during projects 2 to 5 as far as feasible. 
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7 In conclusion 
This thematic group has performed a research project on behalf of the DG JRC. It has confirmed the 
interest of the IACS market’s stakeholders for the certification of IACS components/products. It has left 
aside the certification of IACS sub-systems/systems because this is a far too complex endeavour, not 
within the remit of IACS vendors in their capacity of suppliers of the devices. It has also ignored the 
issue of competence certification. 
 
As for the question of the feasibility of an IACS components certification scheme, assuming: 
1. that in existing cyber-security certification standards and guidelines (IEC 62443/ISASecure, and 
ISO 15408/Common Criteria) there are a number of common elements despite apparent major 
differences, and 
2. that the C&C scheme should engage IACS vendors progressively towards delivering certified 
products. 
The TG proposes a four-level European IACS components Cyber-security Compliance & Certification 
Scheme (C&C): 
• Level 1: self- declaration of compliance; 
• Level 2: third-party compliance assessment; 
• Level 3: third-party product certification; 
• Level 4: third-party full certification. 
To implement this framework, the TG proposes a plan of research and action for 2015-20: 
 
Project	  No	  1:	  Stakeholders	  consultation	  and	  project	  planning	  
Project	  No	  2:	  Product	  Register	  development	  
Project	  No	  3:	  Cyber-­‐security	  Common	  Requirements	  
Project	  No	  4:	  Standard	  Security	  Profiles	  
Project	  No	  5:	  Compliance	  &	  Certification	  Process	  
Project	  No	  6:	  Transition	  &	  Implementation	  Plan	  
Project	  No	  7:	  Launch	  of	  the	  C&C	  Scheme	  
 
An initial schedule and content has been drafted to help planning tasks with two particular 
recommendations: 
 
1) Project No 1 is a key priority and will frame the rest of the plan. This is a short project that could be 
established as an ERNCIP Thematic Group to be started soon and run in early 2015. 
 
2) Projects No 3, No 4, No 5 and No 6 should be carried out as early as feasible, some TG members say 
by mid-2016, to take advantage of a window of opportunity for Europe to make decisions for itself. 
 
Now, it pertains to decision-makers and to IACS stakeholders, including European Institutions and 
ENISA, to consider the TG’s propositions, and to confirm the next steps. 
 
This TG has demonstrated that a limited number of experts representative of the different families of 
stakeholders were able to agree on a proposal and to reach what looks like a hands-on scheme. 
 
We want to thank all those who took part in our TG meetings and work. 
 
Finally, we want to thank DG JRC for their constant support and the high-quality discussions held with 
them. 
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8 Annexes 
8.1 Annex 1: Phase 1 questionnaire 
Analysis method for the 
Case studies for the Cyber Security of Industrial Automation & Control Systems 
Thematic Group 
 
NB: Fill-in or tick boxes, and follow instructions; blue shaded rows are not to be filled in. Grey are optional. 
YOUR ORGANISATION’S NAME: 
YOUR ORGANISATION’S ACTIVITY: 
YOUR NAME:       Do not disclose my name 
YOUR RESPONSIBILITY/JOB TITLE: 
VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT: 
DATE OF THE DOCUMENT: 
TRAFFIC LIGHT PROTOCOL LEVEL (Double click the tick box corresponding to the level of confidentiality 
of this study you desire): 
 RED — personal for named recipients only 
In the context of a meeting, for example, RED information is limited to those Representatives present at 
the meeting. In most circumstances, RED information will be passed orally or in person. Representatives 
must not disseminate the information outside of the meeting. RED information may be discussed during 
a meeting but only when all Representatives present have signed up to this Membership Agreement. 
Other external participants, such as visiting speakers, who are not Members of the TG, will be required 
to leave before such information is disclosed and discussed. 
 AMBER — limited distribution 
The recipient may share AMBER information with others within their organisation (whether direct 
employees, consultants, contractors or outsource-staff working in the organisation), but only on a strict 
‘need-to-know’ basis. The originator may specify the intended limits of that sharing. 
 GREEN — community wide 
Information in this category can be circulated widely within a particular community. However, the 
information may not be published or posted publicly on the Internet, nor released outside of the 
community. 
 WHITE — unlimited 
Information that is for public, unrestricted dissemination, publication, web-posting or broadcast. Any 
Member may publish the information, subject to copyright acknowledgement of the source. 
COMMENTS ON CONFIDENTIALITY IF NEEDED: 
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THE CASE YOU STUDY IN THIS DOCUMENT 
SELECT THE CASE YOU ARE STUDYING IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE (Double click & select 1 only): 
 A SCADA system that supervises entire industrial systems 
 Field process automation and control equipment 
 An engineering/programming workstation that staff connect to 
 A database used for process control (if corrupted may create safety issues, e.g. in luggage handling) 
 A telecommunication link (for instance for remote equipment maintenance) 
 Other, like a link between IACS and IS, etc. (specify):  
NAME/BRAND OF THE COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM CORRESPONDING TO THE CASE: 
DESCRIPTION AND FUNCTION OF THE COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM: 
LOCATION OF THE COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM (Ref. ISA 62443 IACS architecture): 
 
PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS OF LOCATION OF THE COMPONENT IN THIS ARCHITECTURE: 
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CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE TECHNOLOGY OF THIS COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM? 
WHERE IN HIS LIFECYCLE IS THIS COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM? (Double click & select 1 only; you may 
add comments after the selected option): 
 ACQUISITION? 
 DEVELOPMENT? 
 TEST? 
 INSTALLATION/DEPLOYMENT? 
 IN SERVICE/RUNNING? 
 DECOMMISSIONING? 
 
FIRST ANALYSIS OF CORRESPONDING CYBER-RISKS FOR THE CASE UNDER STUDY 
WHAT KIND(S) OF DISRUPTIONS/INCIDENTS/FAILURES/ATTACKS OF THIS COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM 
DO YOU MOST FEAR? AND WHY? (you may add lines below) 
KIND OF 
DISRUPTION/INCIDENT/FAILURE/ATTACK 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
DISRUPTION/INCIDENT/FAILURE 
  
  
  
 
WHAT COULD BE THE SOURCE(S) OF SUCH CYBER-ATTACKS? AND FOR WHAT LIKELY PURPOSE(S)? 
(Double click & select options; you may add comments after each selected option) 
SOURCE PURPOSE 
 NON-IT/PROCESS AUTOMATION 
EMPLOYEES 
 Extortion/Vengeance?  Causing accident? 
 Extracting key data?  Tarnishing your reputation? 
 IT/PROCESS AUTOMATION 
EMPLOYEES 
 Extortion/Vengeance?  Causing accident? 
 Extracting key data?  Tarnishing your reputation? 
 EXTERNAL 
CONTRACTORS/MAINTENANCE/VENDORS 
STAFF 
 Extortion/ Vengeance?  Causing accident? 
 Extracting key data?  Tarnishing your reputation? 
 EXTERNAL ENTITIES (STATE, 
ORGANISED CRIME, HACKERS …) 
 Extortion/ Vengeance?  Causing accident? 
 Extracting key data?  Tarnishing your reputation? 
 OTHER (specify):  Extortion/ Vengeance?  Causing accident? 
 Extracting key data?  Tarnishing your reputation? 
 
HOW DO YOU THINK THE ATTACKERS WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO CYBER-ATTACK THE 
COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM? (Double click & select options; you may add comments after the selected 
option) 
 By embedding malware in components at source, during development or integration? 
 By way of USB keys/external media? 
 By loading malware through a network link or aerial? 
 By loading malware through spam/e-mail/corrupted files (Word, PDF, etc.)? 
 By other means (specify): 
 
DO YOU KNOW/SUSPECT CYBER-VULNERABILITIES THAT COULD BE USED TO ATTACK THE 
COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM? 
 DO NOT KNOW (comment if you wish): 
 VULNERABILITIES THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT THE ELEMENT (provide at least some generic 
information): 
 VULNERABILITIES THAT AFFECT SURROUNDING ELEMENTS (specify): 
 
HOW DO YOU THINK THESE VULNERABILITIES COULD BE IDENTIFIED?  
 THROUGH CYBER-SECURITY CHECKS DURING UNIT TESTS OF THE COMPONENT? (specify): 
 THROUGH CYBER-SECURITY CHECKS DURING INTEGRATION TESTS? (specify): 
 THROUGH OTHER FORMS OF SPECIFIC CYBER-SECURITY TESTS? (specify): 
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 THROUGH CYBER-SECURITY CHECKS PERFORMED IN PRODUCTION? (specify): 
 OTHER? (specify): 
 
WHO DO YOU THINK COULD REDUCE THESE VULNERABILITIES? (you may add comments after the 
selected options) 
 VENDORS (specify): 
 INTEGRATORS (specify): 
 INTERNAL IT SECURITY STAFF (specify): 
 INTERNAL PROCESS AUTOMATION STAFF (specify): 
 EXTERNAL SPECIALISTS IN CYBER-SECURITY (specify): 
 THIRD-PARTY SPECIALIST CYBER-SECURITY TEST LAB (specify): 
 REGULATOR/NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY AGENCY (specify): 
 OTHER (specify): 
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